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False Sanctuary:
The Australian Antarctic Whale Sanctuary and Long-Term Stability in 
Antarctica
Donald K. Anton∗
I. Introduction
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty,1 and the subsequent allied international legal 
agreements  (and  related  measures)  that  comprise  the  Antarctic  Treaty  System 
(ATS),2 is  fast  approaching  its  golden  anniversary.3  From  a  contemporary 
perspective, it is hard to imagine Antarctica without some established form of legal 
governance  --  a  non-juridical  Antarctica.   Like  a  number  of  other  perceived 
essentials, it seems certain if the ATS did not exist, “it would have to be invented”.4 
 Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (2008-2010); Senior Lecturer in 
Law, The Australian National  University College of Law.  An early version of this article was 
presented at a conference on Whales, Antarctica, Diplomacy and the Law held at The Australian 
National University College of Law, 4 September 2006.  I am grateful for the gracious hospitality 
of the Alabama Law School, where significant work on this article was completed while I served 
as a Visiting Professor.   Special  thanks to the excellent  Alabama law library staff,  particularly 
Penny Gibson and Diana May.  I am also indebted to Penelope Mathew for her support and keen 
eyes.
1 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (done Dec. 1, 1959).
2 The ATS is comprised of: i) the Antarctic Treaty, ii) the more than 200 measures in effect under 
the Treaty,  and iii) associated treaties,  and their related measures,  that  are in force.   Art.  1(e), 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty  (1991)(Madrid Protocol),  30 ILM 
1455 (1991).
3 Indeed, the current 2007-08 International Polar Year (IPY 07-08) represents the 50th Anniversary 
of the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year (IGY 57-58) that culminated in the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty. For current information see the International Polar Year website: http://www.ipy.org/.  See 
also Andrew C. Revkin, 2- Year Study of Polar Changes Set to Begin, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2007, 
p.  A4,  col.  3;  Celebrating  the Anniversaries  of  the International  Polar  Years  and International 
Geophysical Year, 150 Cong. Rec. S 11323, 108th Cong., 2d sess. (Oct. 11, 2004).
4 This phrase has been used frequently in the context of international organization, highlighting the 
importance  of  international  cooperation  through  formalized  structures.  See,  e.g.,  GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 748 (1951)(on the need for 
the United Nations);  JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRS 509 (1978)(on the need for  European organization); 
Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT’L ORGANIZATION 325, 355 (1982)
(on the need for international regimes generally); M.H. Mendelson, Flux and Reflux of the Law of  
the Sea, 5 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 285 (1985)(on the need for a international legal regime 
for the seas); John Garofano, Power, Institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum, 42 ASIAN SURVEY 
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This  is  especially  true  today  when  global  contact  with  Antarctica  in  terms  of 
science,  exploration,  exploitation of marine resources,  and tourism continues to 
expand and grow in importance.5  In these circumstances, the presence of effective 
regulation which serves as a driver of international cooperation is more and more 
imperative.
As attention to Antarctica has increased over the past forty-nine years, the 
ATS has been subject to periodic pressures and tensions, but especially so since the 
end  of  the  1970s.   From  at  least  1975,  differences  (sometimes  acrimonious) 
concerning Antarctic resources, access, and governance began to make themselves 
felt between and across groups of claimant and non-claimant states,6 parties and 
non-parties,7 and developed and developing states.8  The ATS, however, has proved 
502 (2002)(on the need for the ARF).
5 On expanding  Antarctic  activities  and  interests,  see  generally  REPORT OF THE U.S.  ANTARCTIC 
PROGRAM EXTERNAL PANEL, THE UNITED STATES IN ANTARCTICA (National  Science Foundation, April 
1997); U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Committee on Science, 105th Cong., 
The United States and Antarctica in the 21st Century, 1st sess., March 12, 1997, at 6-11 (Statement 
of Norman R. Augustine);  Marcus Haward,  et al.,  Australia’s Antarctic Agenda, 60  AUSTRALIAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 439 (2006). In terms of sheer regulation, it is telling that the last 
edition of the HANDBOOK OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM (9th ed., 2002) runs to 993 pages and still 
does  not  include  a  number  of  important  Consultative  Party  recommendations,  resolutions, 
decisions and measures.
6 States  purporting  to  exercise,  assert  or  claim territorial  sovereignty  are  generally  known  as 
“claimant” states despite clear distinctions between “exercise, assert or claim”.  “Non-claimant” 
states are those that do not accept the validity of claims that have been made by other states and, in 
addition, neither advance a territorial claim themselves, nor (except for the U.S. and Russia) assert 
a historic basis for doing so.  See  ARTHUR WATTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
SYSTEM 119-120 (1992).
7 This  includes  differences  between  the  sub-groups  of  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative  Parties 
(ATCPs),  with  powers  of  participation  and  decision-making  and  Antarctic  Treaty  Non-
Consultative Parties (ATNCPs), without such powers.  For the meaning of these terms see Revised 
Rules  of  Procedure  (2005),  ATCM  Decision  3  (17  June  2005),  available Apr.  2,  2008  at: 
http://v3.ats.aq/documents/recatt/att264_e.pdf. See also F. M. Auburn,  Consultative Status Under 
the Antarctic Treaty, 28 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 514 (1979).
8 For a discussion see PETER BECK, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ANTARCTICA, 270-319 (1986).
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remarkably  resilient.   As  an  early  example  of  a  “framework”  treaty,9 it  has 
withstood some formidable challenges to both its legitimacy and effectiveness.10 In 
contemporary international environmental law circles the ATS is one of the two 
treaty regimes11 most often cited as an example of success.12  Its collective value is 
rightly viewed as much “greater than just the sum of its various parts”.13 Given the 
underlying stakes in Antarctica -- including contentious issues tied to: i) latent (but 
certainly not forgotten) territorial  claims,  ii)  the exercise of jurisdiction and iii) 
9 For an account of how the framework principles of peace and science established by the 1959 
Antarctic  Treaty  have  blossomed  in  subsequent  regulation  in  the  form  of  binding 
“recommendations”  – now known as measures  under XIX:  Decision 1 (1995)  – and the ATS 
conventions,  see  CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS: THE ANTARCTIC REGIME 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1998); ARTHUR WATTS,  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC 
TREATY SYSTEM (1992); Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a 
“Purgatory of Ambiguity”?, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 195, 199-208 (1985).
10 For sapient accounts and analysis of the continuing effectiveness and legitimacy of the ATS, see 
OLAV SCHRAM STOKKE & DAVOR VIDAS, GOVERNING THE ANTARCTIC: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY 
OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 35, 37-45 (1996).  For lessons to be taken from the ATS model, 
see  ARNFINN JØGENSEN-DAHL & WILLY ØSTRENG, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 
(1991)(especially Section 5).
11 The other regime pointed to is that regulating ozone  depleting substances.   See, e.g.,  VED P. 
NANDA &  GEORGE (ROCK)  PRING,  INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 270 
(2003); DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 526 (2d ed., 2002)(the ozone regime is “the most important precedent in international law 
for the management of global environmental harms”).
12 See e.g., Donald R. Rothwell, Environmental Protection in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: A 
Post UNCED Perspective,  in  KRIWOKEN,  HAWARD,  VANDERZWAAG & DAVIS,  EDS.,  OCEAN LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE POST-UNCED ERA: AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 327 (1996)(ATS is “one of 
the  most  successful  international  law regimes  in recent  history”);  Richard  Falk,  The Antarctic 
Treaty System: Are There Viable Alternatives?, in ARNFINN JORGENSEN-DAHL & WILLY OSTRENG, EDS., 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 399 (1991)(“governance of Antarctica . . is the 
closest thing to ‘a world order miricle’ that the world has known”); Finn Sollie, The Development  
of the Antarctic Treaty System: Trends and Issues in RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, ED., ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE: 
CONFLICTING INTERESTS, COOPERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 25 (1984)
(ATS is “so effective . . . that today it is easy to forget the tension and the risks of political conflict 
and the dangers of military intervention that did exist before . . . the Antarctic Treaty”); Gillian D. 
Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty System: Some Jurisdictional Problems, in GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, ED., THE 
ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME:  LAW,  ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 88 (1987)(“the  Antarctic  Treaty 
regime has been a remarkably successful mechanism through which universal interests . . . have 
been  protected  and  advanced”.).   See  also  John  D.  Negroponte,  The Success  of  the Antarctic  
Treaty, 87 DEPT. STATE BULL. 29 (June 1987).
13 ARTHUR WATTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 291 (1992).
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governance decision-making -- the ability of the ATS to adapt and retain currency 
has been remarkable and holds a number of lessons in normativity and diplomacy.14
The ATS though, like everything else, is not invulnerable.15  Given the right 
set  of circumstances the equilibrium of the ATS could be upset,  with  resulting 
turmoil within the system and increasing pressures from outside.  Over the life of 
the  ATS,  difficult  political  circumstances  have  occasioned others  to  sound the 
alarm at times of increased tensions.16  It is not difficult to see why.  It seems hard 
to argue that the failure of the ATS would be anything but bad; not least because 
there is no existing alternative vehicle for international cooperation and governance 
in  Antarctica.17  Among  other  things,  the  failure  of  the  ATS  would  create 
international instability, uncertainty and increased tensions in relation to Antarctic 
14
See,  e.g.,  DONALD R. ROTHWELL,  THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1996);  CHRISTOPHER C.  JOYNER,  GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS:  THE ANTARCTIC REGIME AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1998).  For  an  assessment  on  the  25  anniversary  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  see  ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM:  AN ASSESSMENT –  PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT 
BEARDMORE SOUTH FIELD CAMP, ANTARCTICA, January 7-13, 1985 (National Academy Press, 1986).
15 Indeed, at the outset of the Antarctic Treaty commentators were not certain about the durability 
of the solution it provided for the pre-existing conflict. Robert D. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement  
of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 349, 367-371 (1960); M.W. Mouton,  The International Regime of the 
Polar Regions, 107  REC.  DES COURS  169, 269 (1962).  See generally  WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON 
LAW OF MANKIND 366-71 (1958).
16 See,  e.g.,  BA Hamzah,  Antarctica and the International  Community: A Commentary,  in  BA 
HAMZAH, ED., ANTARCTICA IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4 (1987)(following developing country claims to 
Antarctica as common heritage, “the 1959 treaty system is fast becoming obsolete and no longer 
appropriate  to deal  with new expectations  as well as developments  in international  relations”); 
Donald  R.  Rothwell,  The  Antarctic  Treaty  System:  Resource  Development,  Environmental  
Protections or Disintigration?, 43 ARCTIC 284 (1990)(following the collapse of the Convention for 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities in 1989, “serious divisions exist among 
the treaty parties that could conceivably cause the disintegration of the regime . . .”).
17 John  Warren  Kindt,  A Regime  for  Ice-Covered  Areas:  The  Antarctic  and  Issues  Involving  
Resource Exploitation and the Environment, in  CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER & SUDHIR K. CHOPRA, THE 
ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 202 (1988)(“dismantling of the Antarctic Treaty system would appear to 
be a step backwards into the diplomacy of the last Ice Age”);  DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE POLAR 
REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (1996).
_______________________________________________________________________________
Anton                                                      FALSE SANCTUARY                                                            Page  5  
activities and Antarctic resources.  It would no doubt see the revival of competing, 
conflicting and unrecognized claims that have been “frozen” for nearly 50 years.18 
Today’s claims, however, would be pressed in a world where increasing population 
and resource scarcity are much greater than when the claims were “frozen.” It is 
easy  to  imagine  the  heightened instability,  competition  and  tension  this  would 
create.  Accordingly, threats to the ATS pose serious risks and ought to be avoided. 
While the ATS is not near failure or even a crisis, the recent assertion of 
maritime jurisdiction by Australian courts over a Japanese whaling company for 
acts contrary to Australian law in the Antarctic Southern Ocean is alarming.19  The 
exercise of jurisdiction by Australia over non-nationals in this way makes its claim 
of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica real again.  As professor Bilder noted, “so 
long as jurisdictional rights are restricted [to nationals in Antarctica,] the issues of 
territorial claims remain largely theoretical”. 20  Once the genie is out of the bottle, it 
has the potential to excite in other states a new “territorial temptation”21 seaward in 
Antarctica, and with it, the potential for a fundamental destabilization of the ATS. 
18 It is often said the Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty “freezes” the legal status quo for the parties  
so long as it remains in force.  This characterization originates in the letter of invitation sent by 
President Eisenhower to the original  signatories to the 1959 Treaty.   Department  of State,  The 
Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15 – December 1, 1959 2-4 (Pub. No. 7060, Sept. 
1960)(“legal status quo in Antarctica would be frozen for the duration of the Treaty”).
19 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, [2008] FCA 3 (15 January 
2008).
20 Richard B. Bilder, Emerging Legal Problems of the Deep Seas and Polar Regions, 61 U.S. NAVAL 
WAR COLLEGE INT’L LAW STUDIES 504, 511 (1980). 
21 See Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 308, n. 1 
(2006).   Professor  Oxman’s  account  of the seaward territorial  temptation supports the concern 
over the dangers associated with Australia’s exercise of jurisdiction against non-nationals in the 
Southern Ocean.
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II. The HSI Litigation22
On January 15,  2008,  the Federal  Court  of  Australia  issued declaratory 
relief and an injunction against Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. (Kyodo), a Japanese 
whaling company operating in  the Southern Ocean,  including in  the Australian 
Whale Sanctuary (AWS) within a claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the 
Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT).  The court declared that Kyodo had breached 
sections  229 -  232  and 238  of  the  Environmental  Protection  and  Biodiversity 
Conseration Act 1999 (Cth)(EPBC Act) by killing, treating and possessing whales 
in the Australia Whale Sanctuary in the EEZ adjacent to the Australian Antarctic 
Territory.23  It  also enjoined Kyodo from the further killing,  injuring,  taking or 
interfering with any Antarctic minke whale, fin whale or humpback whale in the 
AWS adjacent to the AAT.24
22 To trace the case history see  Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., 
[2004] FCA 1510 (initial application for leave to serve originating process in Japan and invitation 
to Attorney-General  (AG) to intervene)(unreported);  Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo 
Senpaku Kaisha Ltd.,  [2005]  FCA 664 (27  May 2005)(dismissal  of  application  following  AG 
intervention);  Humane Society  International  Inc  v  Kyodo Senpaku  Kaisha  Ltd.,  154  FCR 425 
(2006)(appeal  order  setting  aside  the  dismissal  and  granting  leave  to  serve  process);  Humane 
Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2007] FCA 124 (16 February 2007)(order 
allowing substituted service of process)(unreported);  Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku 
Kaisha Ltd., [2008] FCA 3 (15 January 2008)(final judgment issuing declaration and injunction); 
Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2008] FCA 36 (18 January 2008)(order 
granting leave for substituted service of the final judgment)(unreported). 
For background documents see Environmental Law Publishing,  Japanese Whaling Case 
at  <http://www.envlaw.com.au/whale.html>.  For  case  analysis  see  Sam Blay  & Karen  Bubna-
Litic,  The Interplay of International Law and Domestic Law: The Case of Australia’s Efforts to  
Protect Whales, 23 EPLJ 465 (2006); Ruth Davis,  Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The  
HIS Litigation, 8  MELB. J. INT’L L.  143 (2007); Chris McGrath,  The Japanese Whaling Case, 22 
EPLJ 250 (2005); Chris McGrath, Japanese Whaling Case Appeal Succeeds, 23 EPLJ 333 (2006); 
Joanna  Mossop,  When  is  a  Whale  Sanctuary  Not  a  Whale  Sanctuary?  Japanese  Whaling  in  
Australian Antarctic Maritime Zones, 36 VIC. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 757 (2005).
23 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, [2008] FCA 3 (15 January 
2008).
24 Id. Orders were granted for substituted service of the declaratory and injunctive relief on January 
18, 2008. Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, [2008] FCA 36 (18 
January 2008). Personal service and service by mail has been effected.  Chris McGrath, Barrister 
for the plantiff, email correspondence of February 4, 2008 to the author.
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A. Application for Leave to Serve Process in Japan
The case  was  brought  in  2004  by Humane Society  International  (HSI), 
which sued Kyodo for alleged illegal whaling under Australian federal law, seeking 
the declaration  and injunction ultimately granted.25  The law giving rise  to the 
action, including legal standing for HSI,26 is found in the EPBC Act.  The Australia 
Whale  Sanctuary (AWS) is  established under  section 225,  Part  13,  Division 3, 
Subdivision B of the Act.  By virtue of sections 5(1), 5(4), and 5(5) of the EPBC 
Act, section 8 of the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth), section 10 of the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the 1994 Proclamation of the EEZ 
adjacent to the Australian Antarctic  Territory,27 the Australian Whale Sanctuary 
applies to the declared AAT EEZ.   Section 229 through 230 of the EPBC Act make 
it  offence to kill,  injure, take, interfere with, treat or possess whales without an 
Australia permit, within the AWS.28  The offence provisions expressly apply to both 
25 It was alleged that Kyodo had illegally taken approximately 428 whales between 2001 and 2004 
and evidence was presented that whaling would continue under an ongoing Japanese whale 
research program known as JAPARA.  Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha 
Ltd, Statement of Claim (19 October 2004), ¶ 7.  The claim was amended in 2005 after the release 
of JAPARA II.  Amended Statement of Claim (27 July 2005), ¶ 14.
26 Under s 475(7) of the EPBC Act, HSI was determined to be an “interested person” for the 
purpose of standing, presumably on the basis that during the two years prior to the acts 
complained of HSI had engaged in activities related to the protection of whales in furtherance of 
its objects or purposes. Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2004] 
FCA 1510, at [15]. see EPBC Act s 475(7)(b).
27 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 Proclamation, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA GAZETTE  
(SPECIAL), No. S 290, Friday, 29 July 1994 (1994).
28 Under section 7 of the EPBC Act, Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth), with the exception of 
Part 2.5, applies to all offences against the Act.
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Australian nationals and non-nationals within the AWS, but only to non-nationals 
beyond the outer limits of the AWS.29
One of the elements that the applicant had to satisfy in order to be granted 
leave to serve process in Japan was that the violation complained of took place “in 
the Commwealth”.30  Such an investigation, while dictated by Australian law, is 
also necessary in determining the international legality of the exercise of Australian 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation to the AAT EEZ.  Initially, 
Justice  Allsop  was  prepared  to  treat  as  conclusive  the  determination  of  the 
boundaries  of  the  Commonwealth  by  the  Executive  Branch  of  government, 
including the EEZ.31  
Before denying the initial  application for leave to serve process,  Justice 
Allsop took the extraordinary step of inviting the amicus curiae intervention of the 
Attorney-General  to  provide  the  government’s  views  on  the  application  of 
“legislation  and  treaties  involved  .  .  .  in  light  of  what  might  be  seen  to  be 
Australia’s national interest, including . . . relations between Australia and Japan.”32 
The Attorney-General  stated that  “an assertion  of  jurisdiction  by  an  Australian 
court over claims concerning rights and obligations in the [EEZ of the AAT] would 
or may provoke an international disagreement with Japan, undermine the status quo 
attending the  Antarctic Treaty, and ‘be contrary to Australia’s long term national 
29 EPBC Act, ss 224(2) and 5(3).
30 Order 8 rule 1(a), (b), (j), Federal Court Rules.
31 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2004] FCA 1510, at [19]-[22], 
relying on Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos SARL v Commonwealth of Australia (2003)126 
FCR 354, 361-62.
32 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2004] FCA 1510, at [3].
_______________________________________________________________________________
Anton                                                      FALSE SANCTUARY                                                            Page  9  
interests.’”33  According to Justice Allsop, this view was based on the recognition of 
three realities by the government: First,  Japan would regard enforcement of the 
EPBC Act against Japanese vessels and its nationals in the AAT EEZ as a breach of 
international  law.34 Second,  the  exercise  of  enforcement  jurisdiction  against 
foreigners generally in the AAT EEZ, based on the Australian territorial  claim, 
would “prompt a significant adverse reaction from other Antarctic Treaty Parties.”35 
Third, the Australian government has not enforced the Australia law in Antarctica 
against the nationals of other state parties, except where there has been voluntary 
submission to Australian law.36
In  accepting  that  exercising  jurisdiction  might  upset  diplomatic  concord 
under the Antarctic Treaty and be contrary to Australian national interest, Justice 
Allsop  also  stated  that  any  injunctive  relief  granted  would  ultimately  be  futile 
because of “the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcement of any court order”37 
and could place the Federal Court “at the centre of an international dispute . . . 
between Australia and friendly foreign power.”38  As a result, Allsop ruled that he 
33 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2005] FCA 664, [14].
34 Violation would arise presumably because either Australia does not have good title to Antarctic 
territory from which project an EEZ or even it that was so the extension of Australia’s Antarctic 
claim to the EEZ is prohibited by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.  I return to these issues below.
35 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2005] FCA 664, [13].
36 Human Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, Federal Court of Australia, Doc. 
NSD 1519 of 2004, Outline of Submissions of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of  
Australia as Amicus Curiae, available at http://www.hsi.org.au/news_library_events/images/Whale
%20Case/Attorney-General's_submissions_25_January_2005.pdf.
37 Id., at [28].
38 Id.., at [35].
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“should not exercise a discretion to place the Court in such a position” and denied 
the application for leave to serve process in Japan.39
Significantly,  following the intervention of the Attorney-General,  Allsop 
appeared prepared to return to consider the merits  of the validity or not of the 
Australian  claim to jurisdiction  in  the AAT EEZ as  a  predicate  to  granting or 
denying  leave  to  serve  process  related  to  an  event  occurring  “in  the 
Commonwealth.”    Allsop raised the issue of whether all “the area” of Southern 
Ocean south of 60º South Latitude, in which the AAT EEZ is claimed, is high seas 
(in which an EZZ may not exist) because Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty protects 
“the rights . . . of any State under international law with regard to the high seas 
within that area”.40  In fact, however, it seems that Allsop was really interested in 
how Article IV of the  Antarctic Treaty and its prohibition on making any “new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica” 
might bear on the proclamation of Australia to an Antarctic EEZ in 1994.  
In  particular,  Allsop  noted  the submission  by  the Attorney-General  that 
there is a distinction between the “enlargement of an existing claim to territorial 
sovereignty” and the claim of Australia to an Antarctic EEZ:
it  was  submitted on behalf  of  the Attorney-General,  [that]  the claim of 
Australia to the Antarctic EEZ is not one of sovereignty in the full sense 
over the waters adjacent to the Antarctic Territory (except for the territorial 
sea), but of claims . . . to exercise the rights of exploitation, conservation, 
39 Id., at [36].
40 Id., at [7].
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management and control, and enforcement thereof, given to coastal States 
by UNCLOS. . . . The recognition of the limitations (short of full claims to 
sovereignty) of Australia’s claims to the Antarctic EEZ becomes important 
in assessing whether . . . the acts of the respondent and the contraventions of 
the EPBC Act took place "in the Commonwealth".41
In the end, however, Allsop did not decide on the operative effect of Article IV of 
the Treaty in relation to the declared AAT EEZ.  Instead, he used the submission by 
the Attorney-General to contrast the contrary position of Japan (and most of the rest 
of the world).  Allsop noted that “[a]s far as Japan is concerned, the Australian 
Antarctic EEZ is the high seas which is not subject to any legitimate control by 
Australia under UNCLOS and domestic legislation provided for thereby (such as 
the  EPBC Act).”42  The conflicting positions thus contrasted, Allsop accepted the 
Attoney-General’s position that international discord that would follow by granting 
leave to serve process and it became “uncessary to decide whether the Antarctic 
EEZ is, or can be seen as, “in the Commonwealth”.43 
Significantly too, Allsop noted cultural differences with respect to whaling 
and hinted that the current stigma attached to whaling might signal a move away 
from  conservation  and  sustainable  utilization  to  a  wish  by  some  to  preserve 
charismatic mega-fauna at all costs.44  Allsop explained:
41 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2005] FCA 664, [12].
42 Id.
43 Id., at [42].  Allsop did, however, indicate that the submission of the Attorney-General had great 
force.
44 Even those opposed to lifting the moratorium on whaling recognize that objections based on 
threatened, depleted stocks have “a limited duration, as the reintroduction of commercial whaling 
under the [Revised Management Plan] can be scientifically justified.  In time, the [International 
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The whales being killed .  .  .  are seen by some as not  merely a natural 
resource that is important to conserve, but as living creatures of intelligence 
and of great importance not only for the animal world, but for humankind 
and that to slaughter them . . . is deeply wrong. These views are not shared 
by all. . . . They are views which, at an international level, are mediated 
through the Whaling Commission and its procedures, by reference to the 
Whaling Convention and the views of nation States. They are views . . . 
contain a number of normative and judgmental premises . . . which do not 
arise in any simple application of domestic law, but which do, or may, arise 
in a wider international context.45
B. The Appeal
On appeal,  a  Full  Bench  of  the  Federal  Court  reversed  Justice  Allsop. 
Taking  a  more  dualistic,  traditional  approach  to  the  underlying  legal  and 
international relations issues, none of the appellate judges gave any weight to the 
international  political  considerations  raised  by  the Attorney-General.   Even the 
dissent was in agreement on this point stating that:
[c]ourts  must  be prepared to  hear  and determine  matters  whatever  their 
political sensitivity either domestically or internationally.  To approach the 
matter  otherwise,  is  to compromise the role of the courts as a forum in 
Whaling Commission] can be expected to authorize commercial whaling of Minke whales.” 
Alexandre Gillespie, The Ethical Question in the Whaling Dispute, 9 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 355, 
358-59 (1997)(emphasis in original).
45 Id., at [29].
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which  rights  can  be  vindicated  whatever  the  subject  matter  of  the 
proceedings.46
The majority held that the action was made clearly justiciable by the Australian 
Parliament  under  the  EPBC  Act and  related  authority.   The  court  had  clear 
jurisdiction. The applicant had clear standing.  Accordingly, jurisdiction could be 
assumed by service or submission and questions of futility would arise, if at all, if 
at the time of the issuance of injunctive or declaratory relief.  
C.  The Trial
On remand, the matter was heard in September 2007.  Kyodo, as expected, 
did not appear. Instead of relying on a default, HSI proceeded to prove the facts 
supporting its claim for declarative and injunctive relief.  Following the guidance 
provided by the majority of the Full Federal Court on Appeal regarding public 
interest injunctions, Allsop granted the declaration and injunction sought by HSI. 
This, of course, raises the prospect of contempt proceedings in Australian courts if 
Kyodo does not comply with the injunction in future whaling seasons.47  It also 
raises the question of whether the Federal government is prepared to enforce the 
injunction in the event of violation by intercepting and seizing Kyodo ships 
operating in the AAT EEZ.   Indeed, it has the potential to bring the unilateral 
exercise of Australia prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction to bear 
46 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., 154 FCR 425, 435 (2006).
47 Order 40, Federal Court Rules; Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s. 31. The injunction could not be 
enforced in Japan because Japan does not recognize Australian jurisdiction over the matter, is a 
non-monetary order, and against public policy under Japanese law.  See generally Kenneth D. 
Helm, Enforcing Foreign Civil Judgments in Japan, 1 WILLAMETTE BULL. INT’L L. & POL’Y 71 
(1993); Leif Gamertsfelder, Cross Border Litigation: Exploring the Difficulties Associated with 
Envorcing Australian Money Judgments in Japan, 17 AUSTRALIAN BAR REV. 161 (1998).
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on ships and individuals in an area that almost all other states view as the high seas 
and, if they are correct, are thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
state.48  Expanding jurisdiction this dramatically is clearly inconsistent with uniform 
past Australian practice to not to enforce Australian laws against non-nationals in 
Antarctica.49
Yet, in the 2007 national election campaign, the newly elected Labor 
government pledged to “enforce Australian law banning the slaughter of whales in 
the Australian Whale Sanctuary”.50  Additionally, the Australian Government 
Solicitor wrote to Justice Allsop in December 2007 during the trial of the HSI case 
on instructions from the new Attorney-General.  The letter stated that the court 
should not rely on the views of the Attorney-General of the previous government. 
Instead, the letter highlighted that the new “Government believes that the matter 
would best be considered by the Court without the Government expressing its 
view.”51  
48 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 92(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
49 Human Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, Federal Court of Australia, Doc. 
NSD 1519 of 2004, Outline of Submissions of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of  
Australia as Amicus Curiae, available at http://www.hsi.org.au/news_library_events/images/Whale
%20Case/Attorney-General's_submissions_25_January_2005.pdf.  It is also inconsistent with the 
approach by Australian fisheries laws, which apply only to Australian nationals in Antarctica.  See 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act 1981(Cth), s 5(2)(applies to non-nationals in 
with what is defined as the “Australian Fishing Zone” (AFZ).  Since there is no AFZ appurtenant 
to the AAT, the Act only applies to nationals).  See also Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), s 4 
and Proclamation No s52, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (14 February 1992).
50 Federal Labor’s Plan to Counter International Whaling, Media Statement (19 May 2007), 
available at: http://www.alp.org.au/media/0507/msenhloo190.php.
51 Letter from Tony Burslem, Senior Executive Lawyer, Australian Government Solicitor, to 
Ngaire Ballment, Associate to Justice Allsop, 12 December 2007 (copy on file with author).
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During the 2007-2008 Southern Hemisphere summer whaling season that 
has just ended, the Australian government dispatched the Oceanic Viking to 
monitor whaling in the Southern Ocean, but it neither intercepted nor seized any 
Japanese whaler operating in the AAT EEZ.  The government claimed that the 
Oceanic Viking was being used to collect evidence that might be used in 
international litigation challenging the lawfulness of Japanese whaling for 
“scientific purposes” under the International Convention for the Regulation of  
Whaling.52   But, given the current government’s position, one is still left to wonder 
if it is only a matter of time before the Australian government will act against 
Japanese ships and Japanese nationals in the ATT EEZ.  This makes it opportune, 
for the remainder of this article, to consider the implications of such a possibility 
for stability in Antarctic governance.
III.  Implications for ATS Stability
The HSI case establishes that the application and enforcement of the AWS 
provisions as applied to the AAT under the EPBC Act in a private action, against 
Australian non-nationals, by Australian courts, is not barred by Australian law.53 
From an international law perspective this is unfortunate.  It is even more so, when 
one considers the ramifications for the stability of the ATS.  
52 Joint Media Release by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Stephen Smith MP and 
the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts, the Honourable Peter Garrett AM MP, 
and the Honourable Bob Debus MP, Minister for Home Affairs, Press Release TK01/2008 (7 
January 2008), available at: http://www.australia.or.jp/english/seifu/pressreleases/?
pid=TK01/2008.
53 Nor will the doctrine of futility preclude such an action where it is clear that enforcement will be 
next to impossible, at least where public interest injunctions are concerned. 
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In thinking about the use of jurisdiction established under Antarctic claims 
to territory and maritime zones as a way to provide protection to whales in the 
Southern Ocean, it is necessary to consider the nature of that jurisdiction.  In turn, 
this requires a consideration of the ways in which both sovereignty and jurisdiction 
has been addressed by the ATS.  In relation to the sovereignty issue, it is important 
to recognize that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty54 has not solved the conflict so 
much as it has structured a form a words that allow all parties to ambiguously look 
past the issue of territorial claims in order to identify with each other on agreed 
objectives.55  The admonition of Professor Watts is worth repeating here:
It does not overstate the case to say that Article IV is the cornerstone 
of the Antarctic Treaty and thus of the whole system that has grown up 
around it.  The effectiveness of that article has . . . kept Antarctica free of 
54 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (done Dec. 1, 1959).  Article IV provides in full:
Article IV
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
a.  a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or 
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition  of  any  other  State's  rights  of  or  claim  or  basis  of  claim  to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
or create  any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica.  No new claim,  or enlargement  of an 
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present 
Treaty is in force.
For  a  definitive  analysis  of  the  ambiguities  and  inconsistencies  embodied  in  Article  IV,  see 
ARTHUR WATTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 124-40; Gillian Triggs,  The 
Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a “Purgatory of Ambiguity”?, 17  CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 195, 199-204 (1985).
55 Jon Bouknight,  Staking a Claim in the Antarctic Treaty: Style is Substance, XVII LEGAL STUDIES 
FORUM 399,  400-01  (1994);  Steven  J.  Burton,  New Stresses  on  the  Antarctic  Treaty:  Toward  
International  Legal  Institutions  Governing  Antarctic  Resources,  65  Virg.  L.  Rev.  421,  473-75 
(1979).  
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the conflicts to which its complex territorial situation would have been most 
likely  to  lead  and  generally  has  removed  it  from  the  usual  range  of 
international political tensions.
Yet, however satisfactory the results of Article IV have been so far, 
there are certain limits to its operation and effectiveness.  These limits are 
sometimes obscured by the very success that Article IV has so far had and 
the tendency to get around its complex drafting by summarizing its broad 
effect  by  some such phrase as  that  it  “suspends  sovereignty claims”  in 
Antarctica or that it has put “sovereignty in abeyance.”
What  is  important  to  always  bear  in  mind  is  that  the  various 
national  claims to and rights of  sovereignty  in Antarctica are still  very  
much alive – as is equally the opposition to them of those states that do not  
recognize them. The underlying differences of view remain.  In that sense, 
Article IV has not “solved” the problem.  What it  has done is provide a 
basis on which conflicts arising out of those continuing differences can be 
avoided.
. . . Take Article IV away, and sovereignty rights and claims, and 
opposition to them, will immediately re-emerge, undiminished in vigor.  In 
an extreme case, involving in some way the Antarctic Treaty or at least 
Article  IV  ceasing  to  be  in  force,  the  consequential  possibility  of  a 
resurgence of conflicts over sovereignty is readily apparent.56
56 Arthur D. Watts, The Antarctic Treaty as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism, in ANTARCTIC TREATY 
SYSTEM:  AN ASSESSMENT –  PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT BEARDMORE SOUTH FIELD CAMP, 
ANTARCTICA, JANUARY 7-13, 1985, 70-71 (National Academy Press, 1986).
_______________________________________________________________________________
Anton                                                      FALSE SANCTUARY                                                          Page  18  
It is precisely this situation that the HSI case threatens.  Absent agreement of the 
parties to introduce positive rules related to the exercise of jurisdiction in the Treaty 
Area  over  non-nationals,57 it  seems almost  certain  that  Australia’s  assertion  of 
maritime  jurisdiction  over  non-nationals  will  at  the  least  create  conditions  for 
dispute and discord.  If other states were to follow Australia’s lead, in a worst case 
scenario it might mean the end of the ATS altogether and the revival of old claims 
and assertion of a host of new claims.  As Gillian Triggs observed in 1985:
Were Australia or any other claimant state to give effect to their views of 
Article  IV  of  [Antarctic]  Convention  by,  for  example,  exercising  the 
customary jurisdiction of a coastal state in relation to waters adjacent to its 
sectoral claim in Antarctica, it  is likely that the Convention would break 
down.58
It is important to note that the ATS does not seek to regulate Antarctica and its 
marine environment in its entirety.  Indeed, whales are expressly excluded from the 
ATS in a number of places and it is important to bear in mind that there are existing 
multilateral  agreements  that  are  both consistent  with  the ATS and do apply to 
whales in the seas adjacent to Antarctica.   The purpose of this article is not to 
57 That is, general jurisdictional rules beyond the limited provision of Article VIII of the Antarctic 
Treaty,  402 U.N.T.S. 71 (1961)(dealing with observers, scientific personnel and members of 
accompanying staffs).
58 Gillian  Triggs,  The Antarctic  Treaty  Regime:  A  Workable  Compromise  or  a  “Purgatory  of  
Ambiguity”?, 17  CASE W.  RES.  J.  INT’L L. 195,  203  (1985).  See  also  Marcus  Haward,  et  al., 
Australia’s Antarctic Agenda,  60  AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 439, 443 (2006)
(noting  that  the  controversy  surrounding  Australian  Antarctic  maritime  claims  has  only  been 
resolved by Australian forbearance  from  jurisdictionally “enforcing territorial  sea or exclusive 
economic  zone  rights”);  Jeffrey  D.  Myhre,  THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM:  POLITICS,  LAW AND 
DIPLOMACY 37 (1986)(recognizing it is fortunate that Antarctic Treaty parties have not exercised 
jurisdiction over non-nationals).
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identify all of these agreements.59  Rather, the argument here is that the contentious 
and almost entirely unrecognized exercise of jurisdiction within the ATS over non-
nationals in waters adjacent to Antarctica for the purpose of regulating whaling is 
unsound.  It is likely to lead to less overall environmental protection in Antarctica if 
it engenders conflict and competition.  
The crux of the HSI dispute (and any progeny it brings forth) is whaling. 
The  long running battle  between  the  anti-whaling  forces  and  whalers  is  being 
played out in Australian courts because of the failure to address the issues within 
what  is  seen  as  a  “dysfunctional”  whaling  regime.60 However,  the  Australian 
litigation involves what most other states will  view as the unlawful exercise of 
Australian jurisdiction (based on its Antarctic claim) in the Southern Ocean.  This 
raises the very real prospect that ongoing whaling dispute will have a detrimental 
“ripple effect” on the ATS (and perhaps even beyond).61  
Whaling is largely comprised of politics revolving around a single issue. 
The danger is that the issue of whales and whaling might distort and obscure the 
larger  environmental  picture  in  Antarctica.    This  is  especially  true  when 
59 For  a  more  detailed  treatment  of  the  applicability  of  other  multilateral  agreements,  see  the 
author’s forthcoming article in the  ASIA-PAC. J. ENVTL L.  See also Scott A. Hajost,  International  
Agreements Applicable to Antarctica: A Survey, in RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, ED., ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE III: 
CONFLICTING INTERESTS, COOPERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 79 (1988); 
Maria  Clara  Maffei,  The Protection of  Whales in Antarctica, in  FRANCESCO FRANCIONI & TULLIO 
SCOVAZZI, EDS., INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 171 (2d ed, 1996).
60 See, e.g., William Aron, William Burke & Milton M.R. Freeman, The Whaling Issue, 24 MARINE 
POLICY 179 (2000).
61 As  Orrego  Vicuña  states,  “all  of  the  activities  taking  place  in  Antarctic  are  closely  bound 
together because of their very nature, and all of them have an effect on the values protected by the 
[Antarctic]  Treaty”.   Orrego Vicuña,  The Antarctic Treaty System: A Viable Alternative for the  
Regulation of Resource-oriented Activities, in GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, ED., THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: 
LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 71 (1987).
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contemporary  international  negotiations  on  whales  and  whaling  within  the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) often appears in many ways to be meant 
for consumption of domestic political constituencies.62 Fundamental tensions will 
be created within the ATS if the battle over the whaling issue is brought within.  By 
disrupting set patterns of jurisdiction that provide a fundamental cornerstone for the 
ATS, the whaling issue will reverberate, and not likely to the good, in the system.
I  want  to  emphasize  that  most  of  my sympathy lies  with  the plaintiff’s 
reasonable  objectives  in  the  litigation  we  are  considering.63  It  is  certain  that 
ensuring the perpetuation of whales in the Southern Ocean is important!  However, 
this worthy goal is only a small part of the common interest of all humankind in the 
protection  and sustainable  use of  the wider  Antarctic  environment  (marine and 
terrestrial).  Because of this broader common interest, I depart with HSI and its 
lawyers when we look at the means employed to reach the specific objective of 
perpetuation.  My departure is not so much driven by HSI and its lawyers as it is by 
the legal tools put at their disposal by the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia 
in form of the Environment Protection Biodiversity Conservation Act 1998.
Private litigation, based on an internationally disputed claim to sovereignty 
over Antarctic territory and a further contested claim to an EEZ appurtenant to that 
territory, ought not to serve as a proxy for cooperative (and hopefully effective) 
62 These  concerns,  and  others,  are  raised in  Robert  L.  Friedheim,  Introduction: The IWC as a  
Contested Regime, in ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, ED., TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 3, 17, 27, 28 
(2001).
63 In my view, both ends of the spectrum of the whaling debate (prohibition in perpetuity v. open 
commercial  whaling)  are  unreasonable  and  wrong.   That,  however,  is a matter  for  a different 
article.
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international management of the Antarctic environment.  The negative incentives 
presented by such an extreme unilateral measure are just too dangerous. That is not 
to say other, less provocative unilateral measures need to be avoided.  Indeed, in the 
appropriate  circumstances  unilateral  measures  can  be  viewed  as  international 
leadership.64  Lower level,  less contentious,  unilateral  measures might present a 
possible way forward in the establishment of effective international management.
Instead  of  a  unilateral  Australian  approach,  what  is  required  is  a  more 
concerted multilateral attempt to address the issue of whales and whaling through 
the  whaling  regime  established  by  the  1946  International  Convention  on  the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).  Even if such an attempt involves a difficult and 
long drawn out process, or even if the deadlock remains, a continuing interregnum 
of uncertainty and contest within the Whaling regime65 is better than destabilizing 
the ATS – an extremely important regime of broader scope and objective. 
IV.  Conclusion
It  is  a  truism that  good  faith  cooperation  between  states  is  required  to 
successfully tackle environmental and resource problems which are international in 
64 David A. Wirth & Douglas J. Caldwell, Unilateral Trade-Based Measures for Protection of the 
Marine Environment, in DORINDA G. DALLMEYER, VALUES AT SEA: ETHICS FOR THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
147, 162-63 (2003).
65 Indeed, David Victor claims that the uneasy status quo within the whaling regime is as good as it 
gets and that forcing any plausible alternative will lead to losers who will abandon the regime. 
David Victor,  Whale Sausage: Why the Whaling Regime Does Not Need to be Fixed, in ROBERT L. 
FRIEDHEIM, ED., TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 292, 304-305 (2001).  In the same volume 
Milton Freeman makes a similar  observation:  “It  would be naïve  not  to recognize  that  for  the 
majority of participants in IWC discussions, the current nonresolution . . . is the desired outcome. 
Milton M.R. Freeman,  Is Money the Root of the Problem? Cultural Conflicts in the IWC, in  Id., 
125.  The same could be said of the solution afforded by the ATS and that introducing unilateral 
exercises of jurisdiction over non-nationals will also lead to regime abandonment.
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scope.66     In the case of whale stocks, a res nullius common property resource,67 
cooperation  is  required  on  account  of  the  externalities  that  have  driven 
unsustainable exploitation. 
It is well known that over the past 10 years or so the struggle between the 
conservation and utilisation camps within the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC) has intensified as stocks (at least minke whale stocks) have apparently been 
gradually  replenished  since  the  whaling  moratorium.68  This  increasingly 
acrimonious struggle seriously threatens the normative effectiveness of the Whaling 
Convention and the IWC.  By comparison to the IWC, the Antarctic Treaty System 
(ATS),  has  been  relatively  stable  since  controversy  raged  around  the  issue  of 
minerals exploration and exploitation in the 1980s.  
The recent  HSI case, and the broader context in which it arises, has the 
potential to dangerously destabilize the ATS.  At bottom, this potential is driven by 
the somewhat  jaded,  but  I  believe  basically  accurate,  perspective  expressed by 
Wilbert Chapman in 1969.  Chapman said:
66 Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153, [1976] Yb.U.N. 1043, Art. 1(3). 
See  also  Declaration  on  Principles  of  International  Law  Concerning  Friendly  Relations  and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV)(24 October 1970).
67 Whale stocks are a classic example of a “common property” or “common pool” resource.  See 
R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squired & Kevin J. Fox,  Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A 
Study of a Common Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & Econ. 679 (2000)(examining the British Columbia 
halibut fishery).
68 Karl-Hermann Kock, Antarctic Marine Living Resources – exploitation and its management in  
the  Southern  Ocean,  19  ANTARCTIC SCIENCE 231,  236 (2007)(it  is  possible  to  conduct 
sustainable commercial whaling of a number of minke whale stocks today).
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The nature of [humans] abhors something of value not being owned by an 
individual,  or by groups of individuals  organized into states or business 
entities.69
This  acquisitive  view of  human nature  frames,  in  large  part,  the  centuries  old 
argument about open and closed seas that all lawyers of the sea are familiar with. 
This acquisitive habit lies behind the capture and use of whales by the nationals of 
whaling states,  just  a much as lies  behind claims to sovereign rights in natural 
resources in an EEZ off Antarctica.  Indeed the drive to acquisition applies to all 
common Antarctic marine biological resources and helps explain why states have 
entered  into  agreements  that  seek to  frame principles  for  sharing  these  marine 
resources.  More troubling though, is that in what appears to be coming times of 
increasing scarcity,  this  acquisitive habit  will  apply with equal  force to oil  and 
mineral resources (and even genetic material) found off-shore in Antarctica.70  For 
many,  this  explains why the 1991 Protocol on Environmental  Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty contains the Article 25 “escape clause” built around disagreement 
concerning mineral resource activities.  
This habit of acquisition, and the tendency to exclusive use of what is thus 
acquired,  highlights  the  great  failing  of  Australia’s  unilateral  approach  to  the 
69 Wilbert  McLeod Chapman,  Concerning Fishery Jurisdiction and the Regime of the Deep-sea 
Bed, in WILLIAM T. BURKE, ED., TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN: CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROBLEMS 
IN OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 154, 155 (1969).
70 In 2000, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that “[t]he continental  shelf of 
Antarctica is considered to hold the region's  greatest  potential  for oil  exploration projects,  and 
although estimates vary as to the abundance of oil in Antarctica, the Weddell and Ross Sea areas 
alone are expected to possess 50 billion barrels of oil - an amount roughly equivalent to that of 
Alaska's  known reserves.”   Energy Information  Administration,  Antarctica – Fact Sheet (Sept. 
2000), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/antarctica2.html.
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protection of the Antarctic marine environment in this case; an approach predicated 
on  a  claim  to  exclusive  sovereign  rights  and  the  projection  of  Australian 
prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction in the zone.  The big danger 
is  that  if  other  states  follow Australia’s  lead  in  claiming  sovereign  rights  and 
exercising attendant jurisdiction the chances of natural resource over-exploitation 
and environmental harm in the Antarctic is increased.  It will, I believe, in the long 
run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically 
viable resources.  
